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Abstract
We investigate the relation between aggregate trading imbalances and interest rates
in the Euro money market. We use data for OTC contracts as well as information from
the major electronic trading platform in Europe to study the presence of cointegration
between trading pressures and money market rates. We report strong evidence of
a long-term linear relation between trading imbalances and liquidity prices for Euro
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11 Introduction
The recent turmoil in ﬁnancial markets has prompted a large interest in the functioning of
money markets worldwide. For the Euro area, a small number of recent contributions has
investigated the issue of price formation in the interbank market. Most of the available results
are related to the overnight segment.1 However, an increasing number of contributions has
devoted their attention to the determination of interest rates on term lending.2
Studying price formation requires understanding the patterns of bilateral trades in
the interbank market. Recently Durré and Nardelli (2008) have argued that information
asymmetry is a key driver of the overnight market for unsecured lending. They consider a
microstructure model where heterogeneity among market participants in the access to liquidity
is a source for information asymmetries. In the Euro money market, only a part of the banking
system has access to the liquidity actions of the European Central Bank. This implies that the
distribution of liquidity to the rest of the banking sector takes place through trading activity
in the available segments of the money market. This institutional feature allows Durré and
Nardelli (2008) to modify the framework of Easley and O’Hara (1992) originally proposed for
the stock market. In fact, they assume that a part of the banking sector ﬁnds it harder to
fulﬁll its liquidity needs. The remaining part of the banking system, instead, faces a more
viable access to the supply of liquidity. Through enhanced trading opportunities, this latter
set of banks can acquire information on the expected aggregate demand for liquidity, thus
enjoying an information advantage.
Durré and Nardelli (2008) compute a standard index of information heterogeneity for
the overnight market in populations of traders, the so-called probability of informed trading
(PIN). This probability measure is computed from a proxy for aggregate order imbalances
for funds. In other words, the model suggests that the pattern of buy and sell orders
reﬂects the heterogeneity of information in the market. It should be stressed that this
interpretation emphasizes the role of institutional arrangements and market organization
for the dissemination of knowledge. Ultimately, these factors are argued to drive the
determination of prices. Zagaglia (2010) computes the PIN for lending contracts with a
maturity beyond the overnight, in particular until one year. Moreover, Zagaglia (2010)
incorporates the PIN in empirical models of pricing of interbank deposits, and ﬁnds that
this measure of information asymmetry is factored into money market rates. The emergence
of this result is not uncommon for other markets, like those for stocks (see Easley, Hvidkjaer
and O’Hara, 2000) and bonds (see Li, Wang, Chunchi and He, 2009). However, it provides
1The reason is that the pricing of funds in the overnight market is largely determined by the interplay
between demand and supply of liquidity, with the supply by the European Central Bank playing a key role.
In the jargon used in the oﬃcial statements of the ECB, the liquidity supply should be ‘neutral’ (e.g., see
ECB, 2005b). This means that the the monetary-policy stance should aﬀected only by the decision on the
key interest rates. The management of the daily liquidity conditions should not impair the signals conveyed
by the ECB about the policy stance.
2A non-exhaustive list includes Angelini, Nobili and Picillo (2009), Baglioni and Monticini (2008), Beaupain
and Durré (2008), Durré and Pilegaard (2003) and Heider and Hoerova (2009).
2the ground for further relevant investigations.
The aggregate ‘order ﬂow’ or imbalance is measured as the diﬀerence between the number
of trades that are sell-initiated, and the number of trades that are buy-initiated. In alternative
markets, such as the foreign exchange market, the order ﬂow provides a direct measure of the
net buying or selling pressure of an asset.3 This is based on the presence of a market-maker
or dealer that post quotes, thus allowing the buy and the sell side of the market to meet.
In turn, the quoting behavior of dealers is guided by inventory management of demand and
supply ﬂows (see Westerhoﬀ, 2003). Hence, the order ﬂow to the market-maker imposes a
bottleneck on the market.
In the Euro market for unsecured bank lending, banks trade without the intermediation
of a market-maker. In general terms, the aggregate imbalance between demand and supply
of funds captures the information that allows to identify the direction of trading prevailing in
the market.4 In the interpretation of Durré and Nardelli (2008), the fraction of banks that
can observe and interpret the trading direction enjoys an information advantage with respect
to the rest of the banking system.
In this paper we study whether buy- or sell-side pressure aﬀects the pricing of interbank
deposits in the long run. We approach this question by shedding light on the role of
trading directions for the determination of money market rates. In particular, we focus on
the existence of cointegration between trade directions and money market rates across the
maturity structure of interbank contracts.
Our results are indicative of the presence of a long-term relationship. This ﬁnding
suggests that there are common factors characterizing the relation between aggregate demand
imbalance and liquidity pricing. In other words, an excess demand for liquidity create pricing
tensions in the long run. This is an empirical fact that is well established for other markets,
such as the short market (e.g., see Boyer and Van Norden, 2006). Interestingly, it sheds
additional light on a channel of long-term market power that informed banks can exploit. As
argued by Zagaglia (2010), the extraction of maturity-speciﬁc information requires knowledge
of the aggregate trading patterns that characterize the interplay between demand and supply
of liquidity. The evidence presented here can also be interpreted as the outcome of existing
trading patterns. In this sense, it supports the idea that bottlenecks in the aggregate liquidity
supply can have an impact on prices in the long run.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the key features of the organization of
the Euro money market, and suggests why the heterogenous access to the supply of liquidity
provides the scope for information to matter. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4
outlines the results of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
3Evans and Lyons (2001) suggest that, in the foreign exchange market, order ﬂows explain a substantial
fractions of exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
4Bjonnes and Rime (2005) measure order ﬂow as the “cumulative ﬂow of directions”.
32 Features of the Euro area money market
The framework employed in this paper departs from the observation that banks have
asset-liability management strategies over diﬀerent time spans. The need to put in place
the asset-liability plans generates a demand for ‘liquidity’ or ‘cash’ with diﬀerent maturities.
For instance, banks may issue loans that produce inﬂows of cash at future points in time. At
the time of issuance, however, the banks need to raise liquidity that is transferred to the loan
beneﬁciaries. These cash ﬂows can arise from activities that follow systematic (planned) or
non-systematic (unforeseen) patterns. Banks can have investment plans or commitments. One
of the systematic sources of the demand for liquidity is related to the institutional constraints
present in the money market. In particular, banks are required to hold average reserves at
the ECB over a maintenance period.
There are two types of liquidity supply. The structure of the Euro area money market
contemplates a primary supply by the ECB to the banking sector through open market
operations. There are three types of money market operations. Main reﬁnancing operations
(MROs) are weekly repurchase operations with a maturity of normally one week. They
are executed as variable rate tenders with a minimum bid rate given by the policy rate.
Longer-term reﬁnancing operations (LTROs) are repurchase agreements with a monthly
frequency and a maturity of normally three months where the ECB is a rate-taker. Fine-tuning
operations (FTOs) are executed on ad hoc basis through quick tenders or bilateral procedures.
They take place generally at the end of reserve maintenance periods to resolve liquidity
imbalances and to avoid further signiﬁcant departures of the overnight rate from the minimum
bid rate or an excessive level of volatility. Unlike the other two, FTOs can either supply or
withdraw liquidity to the market depending on the sign of the imbalance.
The liquidity provided by the ECB is distributed in the banking system across the
interbank market. In this market, banks trade lending and borrowing contracts. These
transactions can involve trades through bilateral direct deals, voice brokers and electronic
trading platforms.5 The market consists of four segments, including a secured and an
unsecured segment, swap derivatives and short-term securities.6
2.1 Why heterogeneity and information matter
The microstructure model considered in this paper postulates that heterogeneity among
market participants in the access to liquidity is a source of asymmetric information. In
particular, the framework assumes that a fraction of banks ﬁnd it harder to fulﬁll their
liquidity needs. The remaining part of the banking system, instead, faces a more viable access
5The 2009 Euro Money Market Study suggests that around 35% of the overall trading activity takes place
through bilateral deals, 20% through voice brokers, and 45% through electronic platforms.
6The unsecured market involves trading uncollateralized lending and borrowing contracts. The secured
segment, instead, consists of trades where collateral is posted against interbank lending. The 2009 Euro
Money Market Survey reports that around 60% of trades in both the unsecured and the secured segments
have a maturity longer than one month.
4to the supply of liquidity. Through enhanced trading opportunities, this latter set of banks
can acquire information on the expected demand for liquidity, thus enjoying an information
advantage.
This framework is well suited for studying the functioning of the Euro area money market.
In fact, there are several features of this market that aﬀect the the possibility for banks to
satisfy their liquidity needs through the available channels. These factors are related to
the institutional rules of the ECB supply of liquidity, and to the importance attached to
counterparties creditworthiness in the money market.
The rules of the ECB for the conduct of open market operations establish a number of
requirements for the participating institutions. First, banks have to post appropriate assets
as a collateral. These assets are subject to two types of valuation criteria. They have to
carry the required credit rating, and they must have an appropriate value. The ECB applies
‘haircuts’ to the value of nominal value of the assets used as collateral. The amount of liquidity
received by the participating banks is equal to the nominal asset value minus the haircut. The
total value of collateral required to participate in the open market operations is equal to the
amount borrowed, plus the haircut and the interest paid to the ECB. The private banks that
can take part to the liquidity tenders are listed by the ECB.7 The number of banks eligible to
participate in the ﬁne-tuning operations is more restricted, and is typically limited from ten to
ﬁfteen large banks. In this sense, the operational rules of the ECB generate a discrimination
between banks in the access to the primary supply of liquidity. In addition to this factor,
banks face also administrative costs for participating to the ECB tenders. These transaction
costs may represent a disincentive especially for the banks of smaller dimensions.
Idier and Nardelli (2008) suggest that the possibility for banks to lend or borrow in the
unsecured money markets is largely aﬀected by their reputation. As noticed earlier, trading
in the unsecured markets operates over the counter. Therefore trust between counterparts is
a relevant factor that determines the matching process between banks, and the reputation of
banks plays an important role. Market reputation depends on diﬀerent factors, such as the
size of banks. Larger banks are more likely to have both the organizational structure and the
knowledge needed to put in place comprehensive asset-liability management plans. In this
sense, they can obtain a larger advantage from being active traders in the money market.
There is also a geographical factor that generates heterogeneity in the possibility for
banks to satisfy their liquidity needs. Despite the introduction of the Euro, there is evidence
suggesting that a national bias is still present in the money market. The 2009 Euro Money
Market study indicates that 35% of the transactions on average involve national counterparts
both in the unsecured and the secured segments. Around 45% of trades take place between
non-national counterparties from the Euro area. This suggests that the banks that do not
take part to the open market operations of the ECB can still face some form of rationing in
7Idier and Nardelli (2008) report that approximately 2000 ﬁnancial institutions are eligible for the main
reﬁnancing operations, out the 6500 located in the Euro area. However, only between 340 and 400 institutions
take part, while only 148 participate on average to the longer-term reﬁnancing operations.
5cross-country lending or borrowing.
2.2 The value of information from trading directions
The ability of banks to gather and interpret information concerns the valuation of the asset.
Denote by cft the future cash ﬂows generated by the interbank deposits, and by rt the market










The market discount rate is determined by the imbalance between demand and supply of
liquidity in the long run. The asset valuation approach stresses two aspects that are related
to the interpretations of these imbalances. First, the value of information stems from the
capacity of banks to anticipate the evolution of the interest rate level. Second, money market
participants can gain insight from understanding the shocks that aﬀect the long-term demand
and supply of liquidity.
3 The dataset
In this paper we focus on trading behaviour through bilateral deals in the unsecured segments
for interbank deposits with diﬀerent contract maturities. To provide a full picture of the
market, we use two types of data. The ﬁrst one provides an account of over-the-counter
trading activity. The second one is instead based on bilateral trades that take place over the
main electronic platform in Europe, the European markets for interbank deposits (e-Mid). It
should be stressed that, owing to data limitations, the two types of data cover diﬀerent time
frames. The dataset on OTC activity spans from November 29 2000 to June 18 2007, and
it contains 1709 daily observations. The dataset on e-Mid transactions runs from January 2
2006 to December 31 2009, and includes 1022 observations.
The main reason for using a series of data on OTC trading is related to the role of
reputation in the unsecured segment. As argued earlier, the presence of banks with diﬀerent
market reputation is a motive for market power and heterogenous access to the private
liquidity supply. In this sense, using a dataset on on OTC trading provides a better picture
on the role of reputation. However, in this case, data on eﬀective prices and volumes are
unavailable to the general public. The dataset on OTC trading activity consists of Reuters
quotes on unsecured lending with maturity of 1, 3, 6 months and 1 year. It contains best bid
and ask prices, and the time stamp sampled at a 5-minute frequency from Reuters terminal
screens. In order to restrict the sampling to the trading hours when most of the trading takes
place, intraday quotes are available from 8am to 7pm CET. This provides 120 intraday data
points on average.
6A number of studies has used high-frequency data from e-Mid.8 The rules for access to
e-Mid require banks to have net assets worth more than 10 million U.S. dollars. This prevents
smaller banks from operating in e-Mid. Since trades with a maturity above the overnight
represent only a small fraction in e-Mid, we report the results on overnight contracts in this
paper.
We should stress that there is a substantial diﬀerence in the information available for OTC
contracts and for the electronic platform. In particular, e-Mid provides prices, volumes and
and trade origination for realized transactions. This means that we can compute measures of
trading directions from actual ﬁgures for buy-initiated and sell-initiated trades. Since these
ﬁgures are not available for OTC transactions, we need to use bid and ask quotes to extract an
approximation of implicit trading activity. This aspect is discussed in the following section.
3.1 The classiﬁcation of trades from Reuters quotes
For e-Mid data, we use the method for trade classiﬁcation proposed by Lee and Ready (1991).
For this purpose, we assume that quoted bid and ask prices are driven mainly by inventory
constraints. This assumption can be justiﬁed with the need for banks to comply with future
asset-liability management plans and reserve requirements. Furthermore, it implies that banks
hold liquidity at a level close to the optimal size. Hence, information on trade initiation can
be obtained from relative changes in bid and prices. Idier and Nardelli (2008) suggest that
ﬁve cases are possible. An increase in both ask and bid prices indicates that dealers are
willing to sell the contract at a price higher than in the previous transaction. This is a buy
order, or a borrowing contract. A fall in both ask and bid prices, instead, suggest that a sell
order takes place, or a lending contract. An increase in the ask and a decrease in the bid is
classiﬁed according to the relative size of the change. If the positive increase in the ask is
larger (lower) than the decrease of the bid in absolute value, then the trade is classiﬁed as
buy (sell) initiated. If the positive increase in the bid is larger (lower) than the fall in the ask
price, then the trade is classiﬁed as buy (sell) initiated. On the other hand, if the positive
increase in the bid is larger (lower) than the fall in the ask price, then the trade is classiﬁed
as buy (sell) initiated. Finally, symmetric changes or no changes at all in bid and ask prices
indicate no trades.
4 Results
We construct indicators of trading directions as the cumulative diﬀerence between that number
of trades that sell-initiated and buy-initiated each day. Figure 1 reports the trading imbalance
and the rates for OTC transactions. The interest rate data are measured at the end of the
day, and are obtained from the Reuters quotes. Figure 2 plots the trading directions and the
end-of-day rates in e-Mid. For the Reuters quotes, there is a negative correlation between
8See Baglioni and Monticini (2008), Beaupain and Durré (2008) and Angelini, Nobili and Picillo (2009).
7trading directions and rates for the entire maturity spectrum until 2006. After 2006, a net
selling pressure corresponds with rising rates. This can also be seen in the e-Mid data. Two
factors can explain this pattern. The ﬁrst one has to do with the tightening cycle of the ECB
monetary policy between 2006 and 2007. The second factor is related to the abundant liquidity
supply of the ECB through open market operations that took place between October 2005
and the beginning of 2007. The pattern discussed here can be interpreted as suggesting that
the banking sector tried to pass the excess public supply on to other private counterparties
at rising rates.
Figure 2 shows that the e-Mid has been characterized by a steep drop of funding costs
from June 2008. The apparent loosening of lending conditions at the height of the turmoil
can reﬂect a sample selection bias. In particular, the number of participating institutions in
e-Mid has fallen substantially since the beginning of the turmoil. This is due, among other
factors, by the unwillingness of banks to put their liquidity needs on public display. Hence,
the market may have been characterized by a shortage of buy-side institutions
The ADF tests indicate that the PINs can be appropriately described by a unit root
process. In this section we study whether a long-run relation is present in the form of
cointegration. We compute the standard test of Johansen (1988) between pairs of maturities.
The auxiliary models include an unrestricted constant and trend.9 The test statistics are
reported in Table 4. The null of a unit root is rejected in all the cases, which suggests that
there are no long-run linkages between measures of PIN.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics about trading directions. The ﬁrst panel shows
that there is excess buying pressure only for the one-year maturity of OTC contracts. For the
other maturities, there is an excess selling pressure on average. Some of the distributions are
skewed and asymmetric, which suggests the large liquidity imbalances do occur in the various
segments. The second panel of table 1 reports the contemporaneous correlation between
trading directions from Reuters quotes. Longer maturities are negatively correlated with
shorter maturities. This indicates that there is substitutability in the imbalances between
demand and supply. In other words, excess demand pressure in, say, the overnight segment
is associated with excess supply pressure in the 1-year segment.
Table 2 compares average rates and average trading directions. Increasing rates as a
function of maturity are associated with falling trading directions on average. As a preliminary
step, we use two criteria for the choice of lag selection for vector autoregressive (VAR) models.
The criteria lead to the choice of fairly diﬀerent models. Therefore, our results will reﬂect
these patterns.
9The tests with models with unrestricted constants only produce the same results and are not reported
here for brevity.
84.1 Linear cointegration
As a starting point, we consider the standard test for linear cointegration of Johansen (1988)
The asymptotic p-values for the max eigenvalue and trace tests are reported in Table 4. The
results indicate a strong rejection of the null of one linear cointegrating relation for all the
contract maturities. This result is robust to diﬀerent lag lengths for the VARs.
The cointegration test of Johansen (1988) suﬀers from a small-sample problem as it tends
to produce evidence for spurious cointegration. To address this issue we compute p-values
from bootstrap distributions. These distributions are computed as follows:
a. we estimate VAR models on stationary series that are in ﬁrst diﬀerences;
b. we simulate 50000 series of exchange rates and order ﬂows. The simulated data length
is the same as the empirical data length. Level series are then constructed;
c. the cointegration tests estimated and the p-values are collected into empirical
distributions under the null of no cointegration.
The bootstrap distributions are reported in Figure 3-6. For each cointegration test, we
report the results arising from the two lag-selection criteria. For each contract maturity
and market, the simulated distributions are similar across tests and models selection criteria.
However, there are major diﬀerences in the size of the left tails of the distributions, which
denote the rejection regions. Furthermore, some of the distributions have peaks. These
consideration suggest that there are beneﬁts from using bootstrapped p-values as opposed to
asymptotic p-values.
4.2 Nonlinear cointegration
Neglected nonlinearity can aﬀect the outcome of the cointegration tests. For this reason,
we compute also the tests for nonlinear cointegration of Bierens (1997). The test statistics
involved in both approaches are obtained from the solutions of a generalized eigenvalue
problem and the hypotheses tested are the same. The main diﬀerence is that the approach
of Bierens (1997) is nonparametric, and the generalized eigenvalue problem is formulated on
the basis of two random matrices which are constructed independently of the DGP.10 Two
alternative statistics for empirically determining the cointegration rank r are provided. Given
the ordered eigenvalues ˆ λ1,m ≥ ˆ λn,m with the parameter m and the dimension of the system
n, Bierens (1997) proposes the lambda-min statistics ˆ λn−r0,m for testing the hypothesis
H0(r0) : r = r0, H1(r0) : r = r0 + 1 (2)
10These matrices consist of weighted means of the system variables in levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences and are
constructed such that their generalized eigenvalues share similar properties to those in the Johansen (1988)
approach.
9The asymptotic null distribution of this test is nonstandard and critical values can be found
in Bierens (1997). Second, he proposes the gm(r0) statistic to estimate r consistently. In this
paper, we apply the rule of thumb proposed by Bierens (1997) and choose m = 2n.
Table 6 reports the bootstrapped p-values computed for the test statistics of nonlinear
cointegration. The methods for computation these statistics follows the principles outlined
in Bierens (1982). The null hypothesis of zero cointegrating relations against one nonlinear
cointegrating relation is strongly accepted. At the same time, the null of one cointegrating
relation is also accepted against the alternative of two cointegrating relations. Hence, this
provides evidence suggesting that there is a long-term linear relation between order ﬂows and
interest rates in the Euro money market.
5 Conclusion
This paper is the ﬁrst empirical investigation on the relation between aggregate trading
imbalances and interest rates in the Euro money market. We use data for both OTC
contracts and information from the major electronic trading platform to study the presence of
cointegration between measures of trading pressures and the pricing of liquidity for diﬀerent
contract maturities. Similarly with other ﬁnancial markets, we report strong evidence of a
long-term linear relation between trading imbalances and market rates.
The implications of the results presented in this contribution are far fetching for policy
formation. In this sense, the results should be strengthened and complemented along several
directions. First, we are planning to use a more complete dataset on bilateral transactions
in e-Mid to study how the presence of cointegration may be aﬀected by the ongoing turmoil
in ﬁnancial markets. Second, we intend to investigate how the short-term pricing impact
of changes in volumes demand and supplied in e-Mid aﬀects the stability of the long-term
relation between quantities and prices.
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12Figure 1: Trading direction and money market yields from Reuters quotes
(a) OTC overnight maturity


































































































































































































































































13Figure 2: Trading direction and money market yields from e-Mid































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Table 1: Descriptive statistics of trading directions
Reuters e-Mid
Overnight 1-month 3-month 6-month 1-year Overnight
Mean 493.29 124.06 87.91 115.09 -120.18 202.56
Std. dev. 356.88 79.348 66.35 127.89 222.03 109.30
Skewness 0.4439 -0.4593 -0.0832 0.2525 -0.3604 -0.4094
Kurtosis -1.0093 -1.3030 -1.0957 -1.4735 -1.5532 -1.0090
Contemporaneous correlations for Reuters data
Overnight 1
1-month 0.6129 1
3-month 0.0852 0.4343 1
6-month -0.2831 0.1527 0.8825 1
1-year -0.7953 -0.3002 0.4171 0.7481 1
19Table 2: Average money market rates and trade directions from Reuters quotes



















21Table 4: Johansen cointegration tests for bivariate VAR models of rates and trading directions:
asymptotic p-values



















Legend: The models include an unconstrained constant and time trend.
22Table 5: Johansen cointegration tests for bivariate VAR models of rates and trading directions:
bootstrapped p-values



















Legend: The models include an unconstrained constant and time trend.
23Table 6: Bootstrapped p-values for Bierens nonparametric cointegration tests









Legend: This table reports the bootstrapped p-values for the nonparametric cointegration
tests of Bierens. The results reported in this table were obtained using a simulation utility
kindly provided by H. Bierens.
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